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A Game Theoretical Model of Radiological
Terrorism Defense
Shraddha Rane and Jason Harris
Purdue University

Abstract
Radiological dispersal devices (RDD) pose a threat to the United States. Healthcare facilities housing
high-risk radioactive materials and devices are potentially easy targets for unauthorized access and are
vulnerable to malevolent acts of theft or sabotage. The three most attractive candidates for use in RDD
considered in this study are: 60Co (radiosurgery devices), 137Cs (blood irradiators) and 192Ir (brachytherapy
high dose radiation device). The threat posed by RDDs has led to evaluating the security risk of
radioactive materials and defending against attacks. The concepts of risk analysis used in conjunction
with game theory lay the foundations of quantitative security risk management. This paper develops a two
player non-cooperative one-shot simultaneous defender-attacker game. The defender (healthcare facility)
chooses to defend one of the three high-risk radioactive material targets and the attacker (terrorists or
adversaries) chooses to attack one of the three high-risk radioactive material targets. A risk-informed
approach is used to model players’ payoffs or expected utilities for each choice of strategies. A gametheoretic model (RDD game) captures the strategic interaction between competing players who act
rationally to maximize their expected utility. The evaluation of the RDD game results in a von Neuman
max-min strategy solution being preferable to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution. The von
Neumann max-min strategy solution of the defender defending cobalt and the attacker attacking cesium is
found to be the most prescriptive result, thus favoring the current efforts of phasing out cesium blood
irradiators and replacing them with alternative technologies. The RDD game not only gives the defender
strategic options to budget scarce security resources but also helps healthcare facilities make optimal
choices under severe uncertainty about the terrorist threat.
Keywords: game theory, RDD, radiological terrorism, utilities, attacker-defender, max-min.

I.

Introduction

The global economy has several critical infrastructure sectors with political and national security
importance that are potentially vulnerable to deliberate attacks by terrorists and other motivated
adversaries. Considering the strategic nature of the attacker, protecting such structures against intentional
doi:10.7290/ijns07vrqk
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attacks is fundamentally different from a random accident or acts of nature. Healthcare facilities and
university campuses are examples of infrastructures that face an increase of perceived security threats
stemming from radiological terrorism. Healthcare facilities around the world that routinely use
radioactive materials to diagnose and treat illnesses are well-trafficked and purposely open to the public,
making them highly susceptible to a terrorist attack. Radiological terrorism, including the use of a
radiological dispersal device (RDD) or radiological exposure device (RED), are among the most likely
weapon scenarios because of their relatively simple technology and widespread use of radioactive
material. Therefore, it is imperative for the healthcare sector to use the principles of graded and riskinformed approach toward building the defenses for source security.
The classical risk assessment approach takes the perspective of a single entity (industry, individual,
defender) in identifying the threats that could negatively impact its ability to conduct business. The
elements of game theory, on the contrary, assumes a rational opponent and evaluates the incentives and
actions of both the entities (defender and attacker) affecting each other, with a goal of maximizing their
own individual outcome. Rajbhandari & Snekkenes [1] and Cox, Jr [2] provide an articulate and a
detailed comparison of how game theory fits into and aids the risk assessment process to effectively
manage threats from adversaries. This paper demonstrates the mapping between the two approaches by
adapting the specific steps of risk assessment outlined in the precursor parts of this work [3] and applying
it to the game theoretic model workflow. The main contribution of this paper is to show how game
theoretic analysis could be an effective way to both defend against an attacker whose choice of target is
unknown and selectively deploy security resources based on the current evaluation of threat.
To enable the readers to have a better understanding of both methods, we structured the remainder of the
paper is as follows. In Sect. II, we present the quantitative model of the Potential Facility Risk Index
(PFRI) and a summary of its mathematical framework. In Sect. III, we summarize the key game theory
concepts, notations, assumptions, and mathematical formalism. Sect. IV provides a more detailed
application of game characteristics and mapping between the two approaches. Conclusion and discussion
of our findings are given in Sect. V.

II.

The Potential Facility Risk Index (PFRI) - Background

The iterative process of risk-informed approach [4] forms the basis for the quantitative model of the
Potential Facility Risk Index (PFRI). The PFRI can be defined as a mathematical framework that uses the
triplet definition of risk by identifying the threat, evaluating the vulnerabilities, and calculating the resulting
consequences, given the occurrence of the attack [3]. The PFRI, unique to the facility, can be used by
radiological facilities to conduct self-assessments and gain a better understanding of the threat they face.
Rane & Harris [3] formally introduces the novel PFRI framework by presenting and applying each element
of risk to a hypothetical medical facility. Figure 1 presents the complete PFRI framework.

doi:10.7290/ijns07vrqk

2

Rane and Harris: Game Theory Model of Radiological Terrorism
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.7, No.2, 2022 – SPECIAL ISSUE FOR WOMEN IN NUCLEAR SECURITY

Figure 1. The complete PFRI framework [3]

The threat component of the PFRI model identifies threat as: (1) threat ‘from’- adversaries who may
attempt a malicious act, and (2) threat ‘to’- radioactive or other nuclear material assets that the adversary
might seek to harm. A multi-attribute utility function is used to solve for the asset preference and
intentions of the threat adversaries. The material utility function 𝑈[𝑚𝑎𝑡], mathematically presented as a
product of 𝑈[𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠] and 𝑈[𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚], integrates the attributes of the relative attractiveness of
radiological material based on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) categorization system
and the physical from (metallic, powder, etc.) of the radionuclide Eq (1) to (3).
𝑈[𝑚𝑎𝑡] = 𝑈𝑖 [𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠] × 𝑈𝑖 [𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚]

(1)

𝐴 3
(−[ 𝐷 ] )
𝑚𝑟

where 𝑖
𝐴
𝐷
𝑚𝑟
𝐹𝑟

𝑈𝑖 [𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠] = 1 − 𝑒
(2)
3
𝑈𝑖 [𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚] = 1 − 𝑒 (−[𝐹𝑟 ] )
(3)
is the index of the radionuclide (weapon chosen as a dispersal device);
is activity of the radionuclide in TBq;
is the danger value of the radionuclide in TBq;
is the mass of the radionuclide in kg; and
is the physical form index of the radionuclide (metallic = 1, powdered salt = 2)

The adversary utility, U[adv], assesses the adversarial mindset of the attacker as a measure of symbolism
or intent, X_SY, casualties or life loss, X_LL, from the attack, and the degree of economic damage,
X_ED, from the attack. Swing weights, quantified on a scale of 0 to 1, are used to rank the attributes,
X_k, based on the analyst’s perspective of the adversaries’ value tradeoffs. Once a complete set of
fundamental objectives or motivations is identified, the multi-attribute utility function is linearly additive
[5].

where 𝑘
𝑤𝑗𝑘
𝑢(𝑋𝑘 )𝑗

𝑈(𝑋𝑘 ) = 𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑋𝑘 ), 𝑘 = 0 𝑡𝑜 2
(4)
𝑈[𝑎𝑑𝑣] = ∑ 𝑤𝑘 𝑈(𝑋𝑘 ) , 𝑘 = 0 𝑡𝑜 2
(5)
is the index of different attack attributes;
is the value tradeoff in the form of swing weights;
is the value function of attribute k for threat group j; and
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𝑈[𝑎𝑑𝑣]

is the adversary utility function.

The total utility function, U[tot], equals the product of the material input, U[mat], and adversary’s utility
function, U[adv].
To further the profiling of the threat event, observers develop a set of plausible attack scenarios,
evaluating each asset separately. To realistically represent the malicious intent of theft or sabotage,
observers make assumptions on the following parameters: the physical protection system, adversary
capabilities, probability of detection, number of entry and exit points, and adversary task times. The
probability of interruption, 𝑃𝐼 , is computed using the Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption
(EASI) tool [6]. The components of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) supplement the pathway
analysis, delineating various initiating events (i.e., an undesired event challenging the facility security)
that if taken advantage of by an opportunistic adversary may result in a theft or sabotage. Depending on
the asset and the asset specific scenarios, scheduled maintenance days, radiation device repair days,
source replacement durations, security feature failures and other equipment unavailability times are
identified as initiating events. With respect to the PRA parameters of the incident frequency, number of
trials and the rate of occurrence, the probability model of binomial, Poisson and normal distribution
functions is applied accordingly to estimate the overall success probability of theft, 𝑃𝑠 . The adversary in
the PFRI framework, assumed to be rational and intelligent, evaluates all attack scenarios known to them
and chooses the scenario that maximizes their expected utility. The expected utility of each attack
scenario is computed as the product of the overall success probability of theft and the total utility function
of the adversary [3].
To evaluate the consequences, the PFRI framework assumes that the theft of the radioactive material was
successful. The consequences of the radiological dispersal device (RDD) are examined as a function of:
(1) loss of life, 𝐶𝐿𝐿 ,, resulting from immediate fatalities from the blast, acute radiation exposure, and
stochastic effects caused by airborne dispersal of radioactive material, and (2) economic loss, 𝐶𝐸𝐿 ,
resulting from decontamination costs, evacuation costs, business losses, and property loss.
𝐷𝐵𝐸 +𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟 +𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑆
𝐼𝐵𝐸
)+(
)]
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦

𝐶𝐿𝐿 = −[(
𝐶𝐿𝐿
𝐷𝐵𝐸
𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟
𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑆
𝐼𝐵𝐸
𝐼𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟
𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑆

(6)

is the life loss consequence severity variable
are the fatalities from the blast effects
are the fatalities in future from relative cancer risk
are the fatalities from Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS); and
blast effect morbidity.
is relative cancer risk morbidity; and
is the deterministic effect morbidity

The economic consequence loss value, 𝐶𝐸𝐿 ,, represents the severity of the monetary loss directly or
indirectly resulting from an executed RDD threat event.

𝐶𝐸𝐿
𝐷𝐸
𝑌

𝐶𝐸𝐿 = √(𝐼 − 𝐷𝐸 )−1 𝑌
(7)
Economic Loss (EL) consequence severity variable
is the difference between the two vector components 𝐴𝑒 and 𝐵𝑡 ; and
is the linear regression coefficient.
𝐸

𝐴𝑒 𝑜𝑟 𝐵𝑡 = ∑ 𝑒𝑡

𝐸𝑡

(8)
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Coefficients denoted by 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐴𝑒 for before and after the RDD event, respectively, are obtained by
dividing each economic variable entry (𝐸𝑒𝑡 )by its corresponding column total (∑ 𝐸𝑡 )Where, 𝑒, is the
index of economic variables and t is the index of the states of the economy (i.e., before and after the RDD
attack).
The net consequence loss (𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡 ) is calculated by taking the average of 𝐶𝐸𝐿 and 𝐶𝐿𝐿 .
𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡 =

(𝐶𝐸𝐿 +𝐶𝐿𝐿 )
2

(9)

A detailed description of the above parameters is provided in our previous work Rane & Harris [3]. A
numeric score is allocated to each of the risk triplet of threat, vulnerability (discussion of which is omitted
due to its inapplicability in this paper), and consequence to devise one composite number of the PFRI
metric, unique to the facility Eq (10). The PFRI risk chart, quantified on a scale of 1-10, with a score of 1
meaning “very low risk” and a score of 10 meaning “very high risk”, can be used to communicate risk
effectively and succinctly to the public.
𝑃𝐹𝑅𝐼 = 𝑒

[max (𝐸𝑈[𝑋𝑖𝑗 ])×(𝑉+(1−min(𝑍𝑔𝑒𝑛 ,𝑍𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ ,𝑍𝑠𝑢𝑏 )))×𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑡 ]

(10)

The background of the PFRI is prominently featured in the discussion of this paper is because it provides
probabilities of a successful attack and consequences for pairs of attacker-defender strategies. Obtaining
this information is often seen as the heart of the practical problem that defenders need solved [2]. The
PFRI framework, including threat profiling, pathway analysis, PRA of how events may unfold during and
following an attack, and consequence modeling of the results, is essential for developing a game-theoretic
model.

III. Introduction and Basics of Game Theoretical Model
Game theory is an abstract mathematical theory for analyzing interactions among multiple decision
makers, also known as players. Game-theoretic models are well suited to examine the possibility of
achieving an optimum stable solution between the adversary and the defender. The decision makers may
be nations, people, robots, or even corporations [7]. The preferences of each player are specified by utility
functions, as described in Section II, that quantify the amount of benefit resulting to each player from
possible outcomes of the game; this benefit is referred to as the payoff. A player’s strategy in a game is a
complete plan of action for whatever situation might arise. The strategy fully determines the player’s
behavior. Each player has two or more strategies or specific choices. Strategy profiles, which are the
possible combinations of strategies that can be used by the players, give different payoffs to each player
[7]. In this context of radiological source security, players are: (1) the defense forces of the healthcare
facility on one side and (2) the terrorist or the attacker on the other side. This paper examines the strategic
interaction between the two.
The work presented uses elements of non-cooperative game theory. Cooperative and non-cooperative
theories are the two leading frameworks for analyzing games. Non-cooperative games are those in which
the sets of possible actions of individual players give an outcome. Cooperative games are those in which
the sets of possible joint actions of groups of players give an outcome. The players in a noncooperative
game compete against each other, and each player is selfishly interested only in their own payoff. In some
noncooperative games the players have perfect information about the game (such as chess), while in other
cases, the players may have incomplete or asymmetrical information (such as many card games).
Equilibrium states are possible for one-shot games (games played only once), finitely repeated games, or
infinitely repeated games. Nash equilibrium, named after Nobel laureate John Forbes Nash, is the most
doi:10.7290/ijns07vrqk
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used solution concept in game theory. This notion captures a steady state play of a strategic game in
which each player holds the correct expectation about the other player’s behavior and acts rationally [7,
8]. If each player has chosen a strategy and neither player can increase their payoff by choosing an action
different from his current one, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs
constitute a Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, a simultaneous one-shot non-cooperative game is applied to a healthcare facility (defender
or player 1) housing radiation emitting devices and radioactive sources. The healthcare facility is
defending its assets against a terrorist RDD attack (attacker or player 2).

A.

Notations and the Mathematical Formalism

For this study, we define the following sets and functions:
Players 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 = {1,2} where Player 1 is the healthcare facility, or the “defender” and Player 2 is the
terrorist or the “attacker”.
The study limits the asset (radioactive material) list to the highest value targets (i.e., high likelihood of
success and high impact) available, rather than all the potential targets in the medical facility. Of the
hundreds of radioactive materials available, the three generally found in healthcare facilities are
considered the most attractive candidates for use in RDD: 60Co (radiosurgery devices), 137Cs (blood
irradiators) and 192Ir (brachytherapy HDR device). The sources threatened with attack are the set 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 =
{𝐶𝑜, 𝐶𝑠, 𝐼𝑟} with 𝐶𝑜 being the atomic symbol for cobalt, 𝐶𝑠 being the atomic symbol for cesium, and 𝐼𝑟
being the atomic symbol for iridium.
Let 𝑆𝑖 be the strategy space comprising each of the possible strategies 𝑠𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , where the 𝑘𝑡ℎ source is
targeted by the 𝑖𝑡ℎ player. The strategy space of player 1 is 𝑆1 = {𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜, 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑠, 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑟}.
The strategy space of player 2 is 𝑆2 = {𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐶𝑜, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐶𝑠, 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐼𝑟}. The pure strategy profile is a
vector of the form 𝑠 = [𝑠1𝑘 , 𝑠2𝑘 ] that gives a particular combination of pure strategies that the players
can choose. The Cartesian product 𝑆1 ⨯ 𝑆2 is the set of all possible pure strategy profiles in the game1.
A mixed strategy 𝜃𝑖 is a randomization over pure strategies. Let 𝛩𝑖 denote the space of player 𝑖’s mixed
strategy probabilities, 𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘 ), where 𝜃𝑖 is the probability assigned to the player 𝑖 for defending or
attacking the 𝑘𝑡ℎ source such that for each player i, 𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘 ) ∈ [0,1] and ∑𝑖𝑘 𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘 ) = 1.
𝝆𝒊𝒏 = [𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖,𝐶𝑜 ), 𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖,𝐶𝑠 ), 𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖,𝐼𝑟 )], 𝝆𝒊𝒏 ∈ Θ𝑖 , are the mixed strategy row vectors available to player 𝑖,
where 𝑛 is the index of possible mixed strategy vectors available to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ player. 𝛩1 × 𝛩2 is the set of
all possible mixed strategy profiles.
It is convenient to denote -i as the index of “all other players” than player i. For each player 𝑖, we define a
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility (payoff) function 𝑢𝑖 : S1 × S2 → ℝ (a function whose domain is the set
of pure strategy profiles and whose range is the set of real numbers) so that for each pure strategy 𝑠𝑖𝑘 ∈
S𝑖 that the players could choose, 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘, 𝑠−𝑖𝑘 ) is the player 𝑖’s payoff in the game . Von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions are a result of the Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility theorem stating that
because of certain widely accepted axioms of rationality, a decision maker considering random outcomes
with a known probability distribution will act to maximize the expected value of a function weighing
some measure of the benefits of each outcome by the probability of that outcome.
We extend the definition of a payoff function to mixed strategies by using the concept of expected value.
1

For example, if 𝑆1 {𝐴, 𝐵} and 𝑆2 = {𝑋, 𝑌}, then 𝑆 = 𝑆1 × 𝑆2 = {(𝐴, 𝑋), (𝐴, 𝑌), (𝐵, 𝑋), (𝐵, 𝑌)}
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We define the pure strategy payoff matrix 𝑼𝒊 :
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑜, 𝑠−𝑖𝐶𝑜 )
𝑈𝑖 = [ 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑠, 𝑠−𝑖𝐶𝑜 )
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐼𝑟, 𝑠−𝑖𝐶𝑜 )

𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑜, 𝑠−𝑖𝐶𝑠 ) 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑜, 𝑠−𝑖𝐼𝑟 )
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑠, 𝑠−𝑖𝐶𝑠 ) 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐶𝑠, 𝑠−𝑖𝐼𝑟 ) ]
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐼𝑟, 𝑠−𝑖𝐶𝑠 ) 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝐼𝑟, 𝑠−𝑖𝐼𝑟 )

When player 𝑖 selects a mixed strategy vector 𝝆𝒊𝒏 , her expected payoff, 𝐸[𝑢𝑖 ], is the expectation of 𝑢𝑖
with respect to the joint probability distribution resulting from the marginal probabilities in the mixed
strategy profile (𝝆𝒊𝒏 , 𝝆−𝒊𝒏 ):
𝐸[𝑢𝑖 ] = 𝝆𝒊𝒏 𝑼𝒊 (𝝆−𝒊𝒏 )𝑻
where T denotes transposition.

B.

Assumptions

Assumption 1 (Rationality & Intelligence): Both players in this game are rational and intelligent.
Rationality entails a player making all decisions with a view to maximizing their expected utility.
Intelligence entails that a player knows the rules of the game and can accurately compute payoffs from all
combinations of players’ actions that can occur in the game.
Assumption 2 (Common Knowledge & Complete Information): Each player in this game knows their
own set of strategies and utility function and the set of strategies and utility function of the other player. It
is common knowledge to both players that each player in the game knows the set of strategies and utility
function of the other player. It is common knowledge that each player in the game is rational, intelligent,
and aware of their own set of strategies and utility function. Common knowledge results in circularity of
knowledge that can be stated as, “Player 1 knows that the game is being played, player 2 knows that
player 1 knows that the game is being played, player 1 knows that player 2 knows that player 1 knows the
game is being played, and so on...”

C.

Definitions

Definition 1 (Mixed and Pure Strategies):
A strategy is a complete and contingent plan determined by a player in advance of starting the game [7].
In the simultaneous one-shot game considered here, a pure strategy, 𝑠𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , results in only one of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ
player’s possible strategies being played with a probability of 1 and all other possible strategies being
played with a probability of zero. Each mixed strategy, 𝝆𝒊𝒏 , is a vector of probabilities 𝜃𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘 ) of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ
player playing each of their pure strategies, so every pure strategy is represented by a unique 𝝆𝒊𝒏 and
𝑆𝑖 ⊂ 𝛩𝑖 [8].
Definition 2 (Weak Dominance):
A pure strategy 𝑠𝑖𝑘 or mixed strategy 𝝆𝒊𝒏 is weakly dominated if there exists a strategy (pure or mixed)
𝑠’𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 or 𝜌’𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝛩𝑖 such that
′
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘
, 𝑠−𝑖𝑘 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑖𝑘 ) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠−𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖
𝑢𝑖 (𝜌’𝑖𝑛 , 𝜌−𝑖𝑛 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑖 (𝜌𝑖𝑛 , 𝜌−𝑖𝑛 ) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜌−𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝛩−𝑖
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Weak dominance results in a solution by the iterated elimination of dominated strategies wherein
dominated strategy profiles are eliminated one at a time until only a single undominated strategy profile
remains as the equilibrium solution.
Definition 3 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium):
∗
∗
A pair of pure strategy profiles (𝑠𝑖𝑘
, 𝑠−𝑖𝑘
), are a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if:
∗
∗
∗
𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘
, 𝑠−𝑖𝑘
) ≥ 𝑢𝑖 (𝑠𝑖𝑘 , 𝑠−𝑖𝑘
) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠−𝑖𝑘 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖

A game may have several pure strategy Nash equilibria or none.
Definition 4 (Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium):
∗
∗
A pair of mixed strategies (𝜌𝑖𝑛
, 𝜌−𝑖𝑛
), are a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if:
∗
∗
∗
) ≥ 𝑢𝑖 (𝜌𝑖𝑛 , 𝜌−𝑖𝑛
)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜌𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝛩𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜌−𝑖𝑛 ∈ 𝛩−𝑖
𝑢𝑖 (𝜌𝑖𝑛
, 𝜌−𝑖𝑛

Every finite simultaneous one-shot game has at least one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Max-min Strategy):
Suppose that player i assumes that player -i will know whatever strategy is chosen by player i and respond
by playing the strategy that minimizes the payoff to player i, that is, player -i follows the decision rule
⏟
𝑚𝑖𝑛
u1 (sik , s−ik ). Then player i’s best response is to play the strategy resulting in the strategy profile
𝑠−𝑖𝑘

that maximizes the objective function 𝑢1 , given the expected behavior of player -i. Thus, player i’s maxmin strategy, 𝑠"𝑖𝑘 is chosen by the decision criterion:
⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑚𝑖𝑛
⏟ 𝑢1 (𝑠"𝑖𝑘 , s−ik )
𝑠"𝑖𝑘

𝑠−𝑖𝑘

For the non-zero sum RDD game developed in this paper, the definition of max-min strategy is restricted
to pure strategy profiles. Every zero-sum game has a Nash equilibrium profile of max-min strategies for
both players (possibly including mixed strategies), but this result is not obtained for non-zero-sum games.
Following Wald [10], decision theory literature has presented the max-min criterion as appropriate for
decisions under uncertainty.

IV. Game Characteristics and Mapping of Two Approaches
The assumptions and definitions developed in the previous sections apply to this RDD game. The PFRI
methodology, applied to a hypothetical facility derived in Rane & Harris [3], provides the parameter
values for the game theoretical model. Each player is permitted to use pure or mixed strategies. In
general, the defender can only afford to harden (or upgrade) defenses of only one of the three high risk
radionuclides present at the healthcare facility: cobalt (60Co), cesium (137Cs), or iridium (192Ir). The
attacker can attack only one of the three given radionuclides. It is assumed that prior to the start of the
game, the baseline defenses required as per 10 CFR Part 37 [11] are implemented by the hypothetical
facility; computation of the success probability of theft (𝑃𝑠 ) for the remaining two radionuclides reflects
the existing defenses. The source which is in the hardened state is invulnerable to attack.
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The extended form of RDD game, shown in Figure 2, displays the decision nodes and payoffs for each
player in the form of a game tree diagram. The branches of the diagram represent a possible strategy that
could be chosen at the corresponding node, and branches terminating on an oval shape are unknown to the
other player. This game assumes complete information, which is distinct from perfect information [8].
Perfect information entails that any player can always observe the actions of the other throughout the
game, meaning that in a simultaneous game of perfect information, the players would select their
strategies simultaneously and with instantaneous knowledge of the decision made by the other player. The
RDD game is simultaneous but has imperfect information, meaning that players select their strategies
simultaneously but without being instantaneously informed of the outcome of the other player’s decision.

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )

Figure 2. The RDD game tree with decision nodes and payoffs

The pair of utility functions behind each branch indicate the gains and losses of both the defender and the
attacker. The assets Co, Cs, and Ir indicate the available decision options at each decision node. Both
players, who are assumed to be intelligent and rational agents, will act on the decision option that
maximizes their individual payoffs.
The utility functions for the defender and the attacker are derived from the quantitative PFRI model
summarized in Section II [3]. The attacker’s and defender’s expected utilities are functions of the
attacker’s success probability of theft (𝑃𝑠 ). The attacker’s success probability of theft is assigned a value
of zero for any pure strategy profile (𝑠1𝑘, 𝑠2𝑘 ) where 𝑠1𝑘 = 𝑠2𝑘 .. The defender’s utility function, 𝑢1 , gives
the defender’s disutility resulting from loss of life and economic loss consequences:
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝑘, 𝑠2𝑘 ) = 𝐸𝑈[𝑀𝑘 𝑋2 ] = 𝑃𝑠 (𝑀𝑘 𝑋2 ) × ( −𝐶𝑘,𝑛𝑒𝑡 )

where
𝑀𝑘
𝑋2
𝑃𝑠

(11)

Attack the 𝑘𝑡ℎ radioactive material.
Intent (theft) from player 2 (attacker)
Attacker’s success probability of theft
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The attacker’s disutility from a failed attack outcome is assumed to be −0.1 across all radionuclides and
attack scenarios for the purpose of the RDD game. We define 𝑢2 , the attacker’s utility function:
𝑢2 (𝑠1𝑘, 𝑠2𝑘 ) = EU[Mk X2 ] = Ps (Mk X 2 ) × Utot (Mk X2 )– 0.1(1 − Ps (Mk X2 ))

(12)

Where,
𝑀𝑘
𝑋2
𝑃𝑠
𝑈𝑡𝑜𝑡

attack the 𝑘𝑡ℎ radioactive material.
intent (theft) from player 2 (attacker)
attacker’s success probability of theft
total utility function assessing the attacker’s intentions and radioactive material
preferences (physical form and attractiveness).
Note that 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝑘, 𝑠2𝑘 ) = -0.1 if and only if 𝑠1𝑘 = 𝑠2𝑘
The normal form of a two-player game presents the payoffs from each strategy profile in the form of a
matrix of ordered pairs giving the payoffs to each player from each pure strategy profile. In principle, the
payoff numbers entered in the cells of the RDD matrix (𝑈𝑅𝐷𝐷 ) are (von-Neumann Morgenstern) expected
utilities, computed using Eq (11) and Eq (12).
The normal form of the RDD game is the matrix URDD of ordered pairs of elements from the payoff
matrices U1 and U2:
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ) 𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )

𝑼𝑹𝑫𝑫 = [ 𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ) ]

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )

𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ), 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )

The payoffs of the normal form of the RDD game given below in Table 1 resulted from evaluating the
utility functions 𝑢1 and 𝑢2 , developed for the hypothetical facility using the PFRI methodology.

Table 1. The RDD game with pure strategy defender-attacker payoffs
RDD game – St. Benedict Healthcare
Attacker
Co

Defender

Cs

Ir

Co

0, -0.1

-0.15, 0.81

-0.084, 0.44

Cs

-0.36, 0.89

0, -0.1

-0.084, 0.44

Ir

-0.36, 0.89

-0.15, 0.81

0, -0.1

The “matching pennies” game is a classic example in game theory without any pure strategy Nash
equilibria. The “matching pennies” game, as shown in Table 2, is played between two players – Even and
Odd. Each player has a penny and must secretly turn the penny to heads or tails. The players then reveal
their choices simultaneously. If the pennies match (both heads or both tails), then Even keeps both
pennies, so wins one from Odd (+1 for Even, −1 for Odd). If the pennies do not match (one heads and one
tails) Odd keeps both pennies, so receives one from Even (−1 for Even, +1 for Odd) [8]. Like the
“matching pennies” game, the RDD game lacks any pure strategy Nash equilibria. The RDD game has no
doi:10.7290/ijns07vrqk
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dominated strategies, so there is no dominated strategy solution or solution resulting from the iterated
elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS).

Table 2. A simple example game of “Matching Pennies”
Matching Pennies
Odd
Heads
Even

Tails

Heads 1, -1

-1, 1

Tails

1, -1

-1, 1

Although there is not an established solution concept providing a pure strategy solution for the RDD
game, applying a variation of the max-min solution concept results in a pure strategy solution that could
be of interest to the defender. The max-min criterion states that it is rational for a conservative player to
choose the strategy that maximizes their minimum possible payoff in the “worst-case” outcome resulting
from the possible strategies of their opponent. The literature on max-min strategies describes them as
“safety strategies” or “security strategies” because they enable the player to be certain that they have
maximized the lower bound of possible outcomes of an otherwise highly uncertain game.
Since it is common for the health physics profession to take a conservative approach to radiation safety, it
seems appropriate for the relatively conservative max-min strategy to be adopted by the facility defender
rather than any of the more risk-loving strategies that are available. It is not self-evident that the attacker
would also use the max-min strategy. The more aggressive max-max strategy, in which the strategy
allowing the maximum possible payoff is chosen, could be a better fit to the attacker psychology. If the
defender commits to the max-min strategy, choosing to prevent a worst possible payoff of -0.36 by
playing 𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , the attacker’s use of the max-max strategy resulting in the play of 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 would benefit the
defender, giving the defender their best-case payoff of 0.
In the RDD game, the attacker is indifferent among their available pure strategies on the max-min
criterion because their worst-case payoff is -0.1 for each pure strategy. Under the complete information
assumption, the attacker would know that the defender is conservative. Thus, it would be rational for the
attacker to infer that a conservative defender would play 𝑠1𝐶𝑜 to satisfy the max-min criterion if the game
is limited to pure strategies. If the attacker infers that the defender would play a pure strategy of 𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , the
attacker’s best response would be to play 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 , resulting in a pure strategy equilibrium solution of (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 ,
𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ) under a variation of the max-min equilibrium solution concept. Any unilateral deviation by the
attacker from (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ) would result in a worse payoff for the attacker and a better payoff for the
defender.
According to Nash [12], every simultaneous one-shot game has at least one mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium solution. For any strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium, neither player could obtain a
greater payoff by unilaterally deviating from the strategy profile. Hence player i would be indifferent
between playing any of their pure strategies against the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy of their
opponent, 𝝆∗ −𝒊𝒏. It follows that for the RDD game there exists a Nash equilibrium mixed strategy profile
(𝝆∗𝟏𝒏 , 𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 ) that can be obtained from the system of equations:
̂)𝑻
𝝆∗𝟏𝒏 (𝑼𝟐 )𝑻 (𝒊̂)𝑻 = 𝝆∗𝟏𝒏 (𝑼𝟐 )𝑻 (𝒋̂)𝑻 =𝝆∗𝟏𝒏 (𝑼𝟐 )𝑻 (𝒌
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̂ 𝑼𝟏 (𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 )𝑻
𝒊̂𝑼𝟏 (𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 )𝑻 = 𝒋̂𝑼𝟏 (𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 )𝑻=𝒌
where 𝑖,̂ 𝑗̂,̂𝑘 are unit row vectors. The following system of equations is solved to determine the mixed
strategy probabilities that are the components of the vectors 𝝆∗𝟏𝒏 and 𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 :
𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 )𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )+𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 )𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )+ (1 − 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 ) − 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 ))𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )
= 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 )𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )+𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 )𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )+ (1 − 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 ) − 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 ))𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )
= 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 )𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )+𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 )𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )+ (1 − 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 ) − 𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 ))𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )
= 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )+𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )+(1 − 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ) − 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ))𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )
= 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )+𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )+ (1 − 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ) − 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ))𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )
= 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 )+𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 )+ (1 − 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ) − 𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ))𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 )
After obtaining the mixed strategy probabilities for a Nash equilibrium, the mixed strategy payoffs are
computed as follows:
𝐸[𝑢1 ] = 𝝆∗ 𝟏𝒏 𝑼𝟏 (𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 )𝑻
𝐸[𝑢2 ] = 𝝆∗ 𝟏𝒏 𝑼𝟐 (𝝆∗𝟐𝒏 )𝑻
The results of the mixed Nash equilibrium solution are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. The RDD game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution
RDD game mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution
mixed strategy
probabilities
mixed strategy payoffs
𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 ) 0.49
Defender
-0.09
𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑠 ) 0.45
𝜃1 (𝑠1𝐼𝑟 ) 0.06
𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ) 0.13
Attacker
0.40
𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ) 0.31
𝜃2 (𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ) 0.56
Table.3 shows that the attacker maximizes the expected damage to the defender by attacking Ir with
probability 0.56. The defender minimizes its expected loss by defending Co with probability 0.49. For
these choices, the expected return for defending Co is -0.09 and the expected return for attacking Ir is
0.40. The results of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium show that if either player deviates from its
strategy, then the terrorist adversary can do no better, and his or her opponent (the healthcare facility) can
do no worse, than the equilibrium-strategy payoffs.

V.

Discussion and Conclusion

The RDD game uses recursive functions to model the adaptive response of terrorist adversary to the
defensive countermeasures of healthcare facilities. It’s assumptions of rationality, common knowledge,
and the availability of mixed strategies may, however, not be realistic in RDD scenarios [13]. The mixed
∗
∗ )
strategy Nash equilibrium solution of the RDD game has the payoff 𝑢1 (𝜌1𝑛
, 𝜌2𝑛
= −0.09, whereas the
pure strategy solution under a variation of von Neumann’s max-min solution concept has the payoff
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑠 ) = −0.15. The mixed Nash solution is preferable to the pure von Neumann max-min
solution if two necessary conditions for its existence obtain: (1) mixed strategies are feasible for both
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players; and (2) both players correctly believe that their opponent is committed to the mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium profile. Conditions (2) is not provided by the definition of common knowledge.
Condition (1) is unlikely to be satisfied for the terrorist attacker or the healthcare defender. There is some
evidence that terrorists randomize their strategies, e.g., Timothy McVey claimed that he randomly turned
to a phone book page to target the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City [14]. However, it is
unlikely that many terrorist adversaries would be sufficiently familiar with game theory to compute Nash
equilibrium mixed strategies [15]. Condition (1) appears unlikely for a real healthcare facility to satisfy
due to the difficulty of randomizing defenses, which are typically static and continuously operating at full
capacity. Mixed strategies have been implemented for the Department of Homeland Security to
randomize patrols or surveillance of vital large-scale infrastructure, e.g., the assistant for randomizing
monitoring over routes (ARMOR) deployed at the Los Angeles International Airport [16]. Although the
deployment at healthcare facilities of automated surveillance systems or enhanced security patrols could
be randomized, it would be difficult to persuade decision makers to invest in these costly security
upgrades only for the purpose of deploying them randomly in support of a mixed strategy.
We have shown that condition (1) is unlikely to be satisfied in a realistic RDD game. If condition (1) is
not satisfied, condition (2) cannot be satisfied because both players need to correctly believe that their
opponent is committed to a mixed strategy, and such a belief cannot be correct if mixed strategies are
infeasible. If the necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium are unlikely to exist in a real instance of the
RDD game, the Nash equilibrium solution is not robust for determining the optimal defense policy of the
healthcare facility.
The max-min solution concept is highly robust under conditions of severe uncertainty because it gives the
certain result that the lower bound on the uncertain payoffs is maximized. The necessary assumptions for
the max-min equilibrium solution to exist in a real RDD game are rationality and common knowledge.
Real world players do not possess the perfect rationality and common knowledge of an idealized gametheoretic model, but human behavior in real conflicts between terrorists and security forces is a reasonable
approximation of these assumptions [17]. Thus, we find that the von Neumann max-min solution of (s1Co,
s2Cs) is the most prescriptive result of the RDD game from the standpoint of healthcare sector security
policy.
If the max-min based prediction about attacker’s behavior is wrong, then the defender can only do better
(𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐶𝑜 ) = 0 𝑜𝑟 𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜 , 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ) = −0.084), but not worse, than if the prediction is right. Thus,
based on the max-min equilibrium solution of the RDD game, the healthcare facility could either direct its
scarce resources towards defending Co and accepting the payoff of −0.15 or it could replace cesium
blood irradiators by alternative technologies, resulting in a payoff of -0.084.
Consideration of technological alternatives to radionuclide radiation sources has been recommended by
national and international organizations like the IAEA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Health Physics Society (HPS), and others [15].
Implementing a policy of replacing the cesium source with an X-ray technology in the hypothetical
healthcare facility scenario would both support a more effective outcome of the game and provide an
additional incentive to the current cooperative risk mitigation efforts.
As shown in Table. 4, the max-min solution to the updated RDD game after the replacement of cesium
blood irradiator with X-ray technology gives a strategy profile (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ) with the payoffs
𝑢1 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ) = −0.084 and 𝑢2 (𝑠1𝐶𝑜, 𝑠2𝐼𝑟 ) = 0.44. This solution is favorable to the defender because
the defender’s payoff is the second best possible (their best outcome would be u1=0) and the attacker’s
payoff is the second worst possible (their worst outcome would be u2 = -0.1). The defender’s strategy has
doi:10.7290/ijns07vrqk
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influenced the attacker to target iridium, which has significantly lower consequences for society than an
RDD attack targeting cobalt or cesium.

Table 4. The RDD game reduced matrix upon source (CsCl) replacement
RDD game – reduced matrix upon source replacement
Attacker
Co
Ir
Defender
Co 0, -0.1
-0.084, 0.44
Ir

-0.36, 0.89

0, -0.1

The RDD game results shows that game-theoretic reasoning can augment risk indexes such as the PFRI
by providing decision makers with the capability to optimize their defenses against the predicted behavior
of terrorist adversaries. The RDD game gives the defender strategic options that can be interpreted as
possible allocations of a defense upgrade available for only one of the three sources at a time. This
simplified idealization captures the trade-offs inherent in budgeting scarce security resources. A realistic
policy prescription following from the RDD game would be to replace the cesium source with an alternate
technology and divide the available security resources equitably between the two remaining sources,
cobalt and iridium.
Risk metrics developed from probabilistic risk analysis, such as the PFRI, do not capture the strategic
interaction between adversaries that is shown in game theoretical models. However, probabilistic risk
analysis provides content for a game theoretic matrix that cannot be provided by game theory alone. The
RDD game presented in this paper fills its payoff matrix with the success probability of theft, Ps, and
utility functions developed in the prior publication about the PFRI. The, 𝑃𝑠 , and utility functions used to
compute payoffs for the RDD game are adopted from functions given for the hypothetical medical facility
analyzed in the prior publication [3], and additional success probabilities of theft for 𝐶𝑠 and 𝐼𝑟 obtained
using the PFRI methodology are presented in this paper. Although great care must be taken to gather
reliable information for PFRI studies of particular healthcare facilities, the core idea of mapping the PFRI
methodology to a game theoretical model produces sensible insights for allocating defensive resources
[18]. As future work, a risk informed cost-benefit analysis drawing on input from the PFRI and the RDD
game can ensure that each healthcare facility uses its security budget optimally to reduce the RDD threat.
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